Option compensation and industry competition by Stoughton, NM & Wong, KP
Title Option compensation and industry competition
Author(s) Stoughton, NM; Wong, KP
Citation Review Of Finance, 2009, v. 13 n. 1, p. 147-180
Issued Date 2009
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/60182
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License




The University of Hong Kong
Latest Draft: August 2007
Abstract
Compensation policy has become one of the most important ingredients of corporate governance.
In this paper we take a new look at the issue, by contrasting the use of options with that of pure
stock. We do this by integrating the repricing or resetting aspect of options with that of industrial
structure. We show that industry competition may play an important role in dictating which form
of compensation is optimal. When aggressive competition for key professional staff is an issue, the
flexibility of options may actually become a disadvantage and therefore pure stock compensation
may survive as an equilibrium. Thus compensation trends can be reconciled with trends in the
nature of the competitive environment.
1 Introduction
One of the most significant trends of the 1990s was the extent to which equity-based pay accelerated at
an incredibly rapid rate. As documented in Hall (2002) the amount of equity-based pay (as a fraction
of total top executive pay) at the beginning of 1990 was less than 10%. By 1992 this fraction was
about 30% and by the end of the decade had reached over 60%. The vast majority of this trend was
accounted for by increases in the use of executive stock options.
But executives were not alone in benefitting from options. This privilege was also extended to many
professional workers especially in high technology firms. Nevertheless more employees participate
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in share ownership plans as compared to stock options plans.1 Data from the National Center for
Employee Ownership (NCEO) and the US General Social Survey puts the estimate of employees holding
stock through company plans at abut 20 million in 2006. About 10.6 million hold stock options in their
own firm. Trends such as these have been praised by academics and practitioners alike in terms of
resolving agency problems and aligning the interests of shareholders and employees. Figure 1 shows
the distribution of percent ownership by plan type for various stock-based incentive plans. 2 For
instance, note that 65 percent of option plans feature a concentration of ownership between 11-30% of
the amount of stock outstanding, as compared with only 10 percent in the case of 401(k) plans. On the
other hand, 85 percent of the latter plans have ownership concentrations at the lowest level compared
to 32 percent in the case of stock options. Since 401(k) plans predominantly hold stock rather than
options, this indicates that percentage ownership concentrations are typically much lower for stock
than for option plans within firms. This is a feature that we will exploit in our model.
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that the trend towards option compensation has reversed in
recent years. Based on a survey of 350 of the largest public companies, Mercer Consulting (Mercer,
2006) reports significant changes in the long term incentive mix beginning in about 2002. For instance,
295 companies awarded stock options to their CEOs in 2002 compared with 278 in 2003 and only 273
in 2004. Concomitantly 104 CEOs were given stock grants in 2002, 138 in 2003 and 166 in 2004.
Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic changes in the typical CEO compensation packages. In 2002, 72% of
CEOs received options, which declined to 62% in 2003 and had decreased to only 52% in 2005. Such
changes in compensation have also been broad-based as some firms have replaced stock option plans
for employees with pure stock grants.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theory of employee compensation that is capable of
explaining recent trends away from exclusive use of options. Our theory is based on looking at the
use of employee compensation for strategic purposes in industry product market competition for scarce
labor resources. In our model, firms choose their compensation policies in a multi-period strategic game
in order to position themselves more strongly against their product market rivals. When firms already
1There are a number of empirical studies showing that broad-based employee ownership improves shareholder value
(Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein, 2003).
2Data are from the NCEO and based on surveys as well as databases.
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Figure 1: Percentage Ownership Concentration by Plan Type. The differences in the employee con-
centration levels are illustrated for four quantiles: plans where employees own up to 10% of the firm;
11-30% employee ownerships; 31-50% ownership and 51-100% ownership. The bars show the percent
of plan type that features concentrations in each quantile. Data from the NCEO.
Figure 2: Chages in the Mix of Incentive Compensation. Data from the WSJ Mercer Consulting Survey.
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have dominant market power or face a very elastic supply for key personnel, we show that the flexibility
of options dominates straight stock compensation. However this can change when competitive forces
strengthen and/or key personnel become scarce.
Our key insight is as follows. Since option compensation involves an exercise price paid by em-
ployees, the number granted to achieve incentives has to be greater than the number of shares granted
in the form of stock compensation in order to achieve the same incentives. Importantly this has the
implication that when a firm faces the opportunity to bid away its rivals employees a stock-based com-
pensation scheme leaves more residual surplus with which to bargain for these workers. If instead the
firm utilized options, the greater degree of dilution due to sharing its potential surplus with existing
employees puts the firm in a weaker bargaining position. Therefore we find that the nature of compen-
sation plays an important role in determining the offensive strength of bargaining for key personnel.
On the other hand, we find that compensation does not play a defensive role against a raid by the rival
firm. By analyzing the economic conditions of an industry we specify exactly when firms would choose
stock compensation instead of options in an industry equilibrium. We find that when the potential for
market leadership is greater and when there is a lower probability of adverse disadvantage against a
rival, the optimal compensation policy uses stock. When these conditions are lessened we find a het-
erogeneous equilibrium in which one firm uses stock while its rival uses options. Finally when these
conditions are violated, both firms use option compensation. Therefore recent changes in compensation
can be accounted for by life-cycle changes in industry structure.
The extent to which firms face competitive pressures in a tight market for professional talent is
illustrated by the recent disclosures concerning option backdating, which came to light in 2006 ((Lie,
2005)). Since backdating obviously implies a reduction in exercise price, it makes options look more
like a retroactive stock grant.3 Of course another explanation for the trend away from options could be
the FASB changes in expensing rules which came into force in 2005.
Our paper follows in the tradition of literature on product market competition and financial strategy,
such as Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988). While many papers have considered the
question of options v. stock in recent years, ours is the first to consider strategic product market
3The first CEO prosecuted, Gregory Reyes of Brocade Communications, was convicted in 2007 of accounting fraud. How-
ever he only backdated the options of others; not his own.
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implications between rival firms. Examples of important papers that consider stock v. options in a
single firm include Hall and Murphy (2000) who propose a method of assessing the optimality of
exercise prices and show via numerical methods that options should be issued near the money. On
the other hand Dittmann and Maug (2007) consider a standard principal-agent model with constant
relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices and find that stock would dominate options in terms
of compensation costs. They conclude that most executive pay was suboptimally determined at the
time their data was sampled. Feltham and Wu (2001) consider an explicit agency model and show that
results on compensation form are sensitive to the functional relation between effort and risk. When
effort does not affect the risk of cash flow outcomes, they find that stock dominates at-the-money
options.
There are also quite a few papers that extend the static analyses of compensation to a dynamic (con-
tinuous time) environment, again for a single firm in isolation. Risk aversion and inherent illiquidity
are highlighted in the paper by Kahl, Liu and Longstaff (2003) who derive the implications for an un-
diversified portfolio on personal valuation and portfolio composition for restricted stock. An analogous
paper in the case of stock options is that of Ingersoll (2006), who shows that the Black-Scholes model
can be applied for private valuations, albeit with non-standard parameter inputs. Cadenillas, Cvitanic´
and Zapatero (2004) consider the optimal choice of exercise price in a moral hazard cum delegation
model in which there is a tradeoff between effort and volatility choice. In each of these papers the
original contract represents a commitment by the firm throughout the relevant time horizon, and is
never revised unlike our paper.
The issue of option repricing has been extensively analyzed both from theoretical as well as empir-
ical perspectives in recent years. Acharya, John and Sundaram (2000) consider the conditions under
which resetting instead of precommitment to maintain exercise prices are optimal. Their tradeoff,
which is the rent appropriated by the agent in down states with the efficiency induced by reincentiviza-
tion in those states is basically the same as in our model of accounting choice. In a related paper Saly
(1994) develops both a theoretical model as well as an empirical test of option repricing following an
exogenous negative shock (i.e., not under the control of an agent). Her predictions are borne out when
confronted with the data following the 1987 stock market crash. Other relevant papers on the subject
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of option repricing include Carter and Lynch (2001), Grein, Hand and Klassen (2005), Chidambaran
and Prabhala (2003), Yang and Carleton (2002) and Jin and Meulbroek (2002).
In section 2 we propose a simple agency model of a dynamic model of uncertain production. We
first analyze a specific numerical example to provide a preview of our later general results. In section
3 we conduct the analysis of a single firm and show under what conditions options strictly dominates
stock. In section 4 we investigate an industry equilibrium situation with labor market competition as
well as product market competition. Implications and extensions to our analysis are explored in section
5. Section 6 is the concluding section.
2 The Basic Model and a Preview
In this section we develop the basic version of our model and utilize a numerical example to preview our
main result. The firm is in a multiperiod environment in which its professional staff must be incentivized
in each period in order to create the highest possible market value. We look at the respective roles of
the use of stock and option compensation in this respect. The model is based on that of Acharya et al.
(2000). As in their paper, we assume that both the firm and its workers are risk-neutral.
2.1 Details
Consider a firm which lasts for two periods with three dates, t = 0, 1, and 2. At t = 0, owners
of the firm hire a manager and professional staff who all have to exert an unobservable effort at a
personal cost, ν , in order to innovate a new product, technology or a production process. As we are
not considering conflicts between managers and the staff, we model them together as an aggregate
agent. If the effort is exerted initially then with probability p there is a favorable outcome (“no shock”)
and with probability 1 − p there is an unfavorable outcome (“shock”). On the other hand, if effort
is not exerted initially the shock occurs with certainty. Therefore initial effort is required to give the
firm an opportunity to experience a better outcome. Examples of the types of shocks that can occur
are unforseen circumstances such as the failure of clinical trials in the case of biotechnology, shifts in
market demand for products, or changes in governmental policy. If the adverse shock occurs the highest
level of profits or market value will be impossible to achieve.
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At the interim date, t = 1, it is known whether a shock has occurred or not.4 In either case a further
unobservable effort is required in order to obtain higher profits. If the shock has not occurred, the
total cost of product innovation is c1 only if a further effort of µ1 is committed at t = 1. In this case
the final profit of the firm at time t = 2 is denoted by pim(c1). If no shock occurs and further effort is
not expended the total cost of product innovation is c2 > c1 and the final profit is pim(c2). The profit
functions are decreasing in costs and concave.
When the shock occurs, either because effort was initially expended and the outcome was unfavor-
able with probability 1− p or no initial effort was expended then a further effort expenditure at private
cost µ2 will lead to an outcome in which product innovation cost is c2 and profit is pim(c2). If the t = 1
effort is not expended, then product innovation cost is prohibitive and we assume the product is not
developed and final profit, pim = 0.
In order to clarify the meaning of these time periods and states we make two assumptions. First,
we assume that the cost of effort in the first period is sufficiently large relative to the cost of effort in
the second period when a shock is observed. Second the relative net benefit (profits minus effort cost)
is greater after no shock as compared to the shock state. These are stated as follows:






In summary, the highest final profit is obtained if and only if effort is expended in both periods and
the shock does not occur. The intermediate profit is obtained either if the shock does not occur but
second period effort is neglected or if the shock occurs but second period effort is undertaken. The final
profit is zero if no effort is expended in both periods.
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of information from the perspective of the market value of the firm
and the final distribution of terminal cash flows. The specific numerical values refer to the numerical
example analyzed below.
4In an earlier draft of the paper (available on request), we analyzed a situation in which the shock was only privately
observed by the firm, although the firm could commit to a reporting policy on what to reveal. The basic results on optimal
compensation were preserved in this extension.
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Figure 3: Evolution of information and distribution of terminal cash flows. Numbers in parenthesis
refer to the numerical example of this section.
2.2 Compensation Contracts
In general with risk neutral parties, it is well-known that the first best outcome can be achieved by
“selling” the firm to the agents. However this is only possible if they have vast wealth, which we believe
to be unrealistic. Therefore the motivation will have to be achieved through appropriate compensation
contracting.
We now consider two alternative compensation systems for the professional staff. Although clearly
the actual set of compensation contracts in practice can be very complex and based on a wide variety
of subjective and objective bonus and promotion-based criteria, here our purpose is to contrast the use
of straight stock compensation and option compensation. An example of a more complicated contract
would be the use of state-contingent stock compensation, e.g., stock grants based on future performance
indices. In the context of this model, this form of compensation is similar to the use of options although
we discuss the differences in section 5. In the single firm model vesting will not matter because all
employees remain with the firm, although for convenience we assume vesting occurs at the final date
for both stock and option contracts. The major difference between the two forms of compensation deals
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with the possibility of resetting the exercise price of options at the interim date for reincentivization
purposes.
2.3 Numerical Example
In order to preview the more general results of our model we utilize the numbers in parenthesis in
figure 3 for a numerical illustration. We maintain the flexibility to consider the range of values for p
such that 0 < p < 3/5. As is seen, the respective profit levels are $25 without the shock and $15 with
the shock and subsequent effort. For the purpose of this example, further effort in the absence of the
shock is costless (µ1 = 0).
2.3.1 Stock Compensation
First consider the use of pure stock compensation with the number of shares given to employees equal
to s0 = (1− p)/10p. To see that this is the minimum number of shares to induce effort, note that the
net payoff for employees in the subtree at t = 1 after the shock is
s015− 1 = 5(3/5− p)2p > 0,
since p < 3/5. The expected payoff to the employees for exerting initial effort at t = 0 is






which is exactly equal to the payoff if the workers do not exert the initial effort. Now considering the
payoff to shareholders owning the remaining (1− s0) shares, we find that
V (stock) = p(1− s0)25+ (1− p)(1− s0)15 = (11p− 1)(3+ 2p)2p .
2.3.2 Option Compensation
When options are employed, we assume that they are issued initially at-the-money, which means that
the exercise price is set at x0 = p25+(1−p)15 = (15+10p). In this case the optimal number of options
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granted to the employees can be shown to be equal to α0 = 1/(10p(1−p)). Notice that α0 = s0/(1−p)2,
which shows that the number of options granted when options are used is greater than the number of
shares granted with pure stock compensation.
After the shock occurs it is necessary to reprice the options to induce effort. However this can be
done in a manner to just induce effort without leaving any extra rent. Therefore in the subtree at t = 1
after a shock the employees receive a gross payoff equal to one, the cost of extra effort, or a net payoff
of zero. The expected ex ante payoff to the professional employees if they exert the initial effort at t = 0
is therefore
pα0(25− x0) + (1− p)0− 1 = 0,
using the value of α0 from above. Therefore α0 from above is the minimum number of options to
provide initial incentives. The firm’s shareholders receive a net payoff of
V (options) = p(25−α0(25− x0)) + (1− p)(15− 1) = 13+ 11p.
Note that the difference in payoff to the shareholders in the two compensation regimes is






since p < 3/5. Hence, the firm always prefers option compensation to pure stock compensation. This
is the main result proved in general in the next section that when firms are in isolation the generality
of options compensation is better than stock compensation.
2.3.3 Industrial Competition
The above conclusion may not hold if there is industrial competition. Suppose that there is a rival
firm that is susceptible to raiding of its key personnel by an incumbent firm. In the shock case, the
incumbent firm faces the same scenario as described above: It has to induce its workers to exert the
additional effort at t = 1 in order to generate $15. However, in the no-shock case, the incumbent firm
encounters a choice of two strategies. The incumbent firm may attempt to recruit its rivals workers in
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order to obtain competitive advantage. We assume for example that this requires a payment of $7 in
total for the additional staff, but that additional gross profits equal to $35 are then obtained at time
t = 2. If the incumbent is unable to accomplish this, then it would receive $25 at t = 2 as before.
Let us reconsider the previous stock and option compensation schemes, which remain incentive
compatible to induce workers to expend effort in the first period. Consider the situation where the
incumbent has used option compensation. In this case the net payoff to the firms shareholders after
paying their own workers when it makes the takeover of the rival workforce is
V1(option, takeover) = 35− 7−α0(35− x0).
However if the potential takeover does not occur, the payoff is
V1(option, no takeover) = 25−α0(25− x0).
The conditions under which no takeover is optimal becomes 3p(1− p) < 1, which holds for all values
of p. Therefore sharing the surplus profit with newly recruited and existing workers in the case of
option compensation rules out this form of competitive advantage. As before, the incumbent firm using
options obtains ex ante value equal to V (options) = 13+ 11p.
Now, if the firm uses the pure stock compensation scheme, buying out the rival firm’s workers is
optimal if and only if the following condition holds:
(1− s0)35− 7> (1− s0)25,
which can be simplified to p > 1/4. (If p < 1/4, then the analysis is the same as in the single firm
case and options are always dominant.) This is one of the keys to our analysis: the incumbent firm
acts tougher in the subgame with respect to its rival after stock compensation is used, as compared to
options compensation because there is more dilution of shareholder interests in the latter case.
If 1/4 < p < 3/5, the incumbent firm will obtain a competitive advantage at time t = 1. The ex
11
ante profit becomes
V (stock) = p(1− s0)35− 7+ (1− p)(1− s0)15 = (11p− 1)(3+ 4p)2p − 7p.
With the consideration of industrial competition, the firm prefers pure stock compensation to option
compensation if
V (stock)− V (options) = (11p− 1)(3+ 4p)
2p
− 7p− (13+ 11p) = 8p
2 + 3p− 3
2p
> 0,
which will hold whenever p > (
p
105−3)/160 = 0.453. Therefore we have illustrated conditions under
which stock compensation gives greater benefit to the firm than does option competition. In general
the higher is p, the probability of not receiving the shock the more likely is pure stock compensation to
survive as an optimal form of remuneration to the employees. Intuitively the absence of a downward
shock gives it a greater potential to profit from competitive advantage against its rival.
3 Single Firm Analysis
We now develop the analysis of the full model and prove our results for the general model parameters.
In the general model we consider the question of intertemporal contracting revisions.
3.1 Stock Compensation
Consider the use of pure stock compensation. In this case, at the initial date the firm grants the staff
a fraction, s0, of ending firm value. If necessary, at the interim date, the firm can grant the employees
additional shares in order to induce effort in the second period. In no case is the firm allowed to reduce
stock compensation granted at the initial date. We denote the (possibly revised) shares granted when
there is no shock by s1 and the shares granted with a shock by s2.
Thus, in this case, the firm solves the following principal-agent problem:5
max
s0,s1,s2
p(1− s1)pim(c1) + (1− p)(1− s2)pim(c2) (3)
5We assume the parameter values are such that the firm wants to induce full effort in both periods.
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subject to
ps1(pim(c1)−µ1) + (1− p)[s2pim(c2)−µ2]− ν ≥ s2pim(c2)−µ2, (4)
s1(pim(c1)−pim(c2))≥ µ1, (5)
s2pim(c2)≥ µ2, (6)
s1 ≥ s0 (7)
s2 ≥ s0 (8)
where (4) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the provision of effort at t = 0, (5) and (6) are
the staff’s subgame perfect incentive compatibility constraints for effort at t = 1 and equations (7) and
(8) ensure that the stock compensation is not state contingent, i.e., the grant may not be reduced at
t = 1.
In the solution to (3) we can show that under our previous meaningful economic assumptions the
incentive compatibility constraint for initial effort, (4) is always binding. We can regard the firm as
using this constraint to establish the initial value of stock compensation s0. Then the compensation
may or may not need to be revised upward at t = 1 in the shock state. Compensation will never need
to be revised upward in the no shock state because initial incentives are always sufficient for interim
date incentives. We state our formal results in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. In the solution to the stock compensation problem (3), the initial incentive compatibility





the initial compensation level, s0 = s1 = s2 is sufficient for interim incentives and both interim incentive
compatibility constraints, (5) and (6) are not binding. Whenever
ν/p ≤ µ2pim(c1)pim(c2) −µ1, (10)
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the initial compensation level, s0 = s1 and s2 > s0, is adjusted upward only in the state after the adverse
shock. In this case the interim incentive compatibility constraint (5) is not binding while constraint (6) is
binding.
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition shows that (9) is the key condition governing the situation under which the stock
compensation established initially for the first period effort is sufficient to sustain incentives for the
second period after a shock. This condition is likely to hold whenever the cost of first period effort
is large compared to the second period effort cost, or if the probability of not having a shock is small
or if the difference in profit in the two states is not very large. In this case the firm needs to make
an ex ante commitment in the form of a sizeable stock grant at the initial date in order to commit to
sufficient compensation at the interim date. However this commitment overcompensates the workers
in both states and they earn rents at that time. When condition (10) holds, reincentivizing the workers
is necessitated when the shock occurs because setting initial incentives too high only gives workers
excess rents in the no shock state. Therefore in this latter case the workers earn zero rents in the shock
state but positive rents in the no shock state. These rents occur because stock compensation cannot be
withdrawn or reduced at the interim date.
To solve for the optimal level of initial stock compensation when (9) holds, we can set (4) as an
equality with s1 = s2 = s0 and solve for s0. We then obtain the following




Similarly we can solve for the optimal initial compensation when the condition (10) holds.





We can now solve for the optimal value of the shareholders equity in the stock compensation case
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as a function of the stock compensation level. Recall from proposition 1 that the initial incentive
compatibility constraint, (4), is binding. Substituting this with equality into the objective function (3)
gives the following result.
COROLLARY 3. The shareholder value in the optimal stock compensation is equal to
V (stock) = ppim(c1) + (1− p)pim(c2)− ν − pµ1− (1− p)µ2− [s2pim(c2)−µ2]. (13)
Notice that equation (13) shows that the shareholders value is equal to the aggregate expected
profit minus the expected costs of effort expenditure (first and second period) less the rent given to
the workers in the shock state, which is equal to s2pim(c2)− µ2. Notice importantly that the rent to
workers in the no shock state does not enter into the shareholder value equation. This is because the
firm wants to encourage the employees to undertake effort. Any surplus in the no shock state occurs
only after effort is undertaken and therefore benefits the shareholders. Any surplus in the shock state
is costly to them because it means that they might have failed to exert effort initially. At the optimal
contract, the surplus in the no shock state is the minimal amount required to provide initial incentives.
Corollary 3 establishes further that equation (9) of proposition 1 is the crucial determinant of whether
the surplus is positive or not, and therefore costly to shareholders. This condition is equivalent to
having a nonbinding incentive compatibility constraint in the second period when the shock occurs.
Otherwise when this condition does not hold initial stock compensation is adjusted upward, s2 > s0
such that s2pim(c2) = µ2. In this case there is surplus given to the workers in the no shock state but this
is not costly to the firm ex ante.
3.2 Options Compensation
Now we consider options-based compensation. Here the firm grants the staff α0 call options on firm
value with an exercise price, x0.
6 The firm sets the exercise price, x , such that the call options are
at the money at t = 0, which is the practice followed by most firms. We assume in this model that
accounting considerations such as whether options are expensed or not have no cash-flow consequences
6We do not consider the leverage-related effects due to the difference between the fact that options are typically written on
stock, not overall firm value. Strategic use of debt policy might have consequences similar to that considered here (Brander
and Lewis, 1986) and (Maksimovic, 1988)
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to shareholders or employees. Thus, we have pim(c2) < x0 < pim(c1). It is clear that when the adverse
shock occurs at t = 1, the call options will be underwater. If resetting of the call options is not allowed,
the staff will have no incentives to devise the restructuring process at t = 1 since µ2 > 0. To give them
proper incentives, the firm grants α2 new call options with an exercise price, x2, to the staff. The firm
now has to choose the options to be ‘in the money’ in order to provide the requisite incentives at t = 1.
Thus, we have 0 < x2 < pim(c2).7 Again, we assume that there are no direct or deadweight costs of
repricing options so that considerations such as variable accounting or regulatory expenses associated
with canceling and regranting are neglected.
When effort is initially expended and the firm does not incur the adverse shock then the options
will be in the money eventually only if the workers expend second period effort. Therefore it is not
necessary to reset the exercise price in this case. Still depending on the original number of options
granted, it might be necessary to increase them in order to reincentivize the workers.
The principal-agent problem faced by the firm using options is similar to that of (3) except that
using the resetting feature, we know that the incentive compatibility constraint in the case with the
shock is binding. At t = 0, the firm solves the following principal-agent problem:8
max
α0,α1,α2
p{pim(c1)−α1[pim(c1)− x0]}+ (1− p){pim(c2)−α2[pim(c2)− x2]} (14)
subject to
p{α1[pim(c1)− x0]−µ1}+ (1− p){α2[pim(c2)− x2]−µ2} − ν ≥ α2[pim(c2)− x2]−µ2, (15)
α1(pim(c1)− x0)−µ1 ≥ 0 (16)
α2[pim(c2)− x2]−µ2 ≥ 0, (17)
α1 ≥ α0 (18)
7The necessity to reset the options in the money is due to the lack of further uncertainty at time t = 1. In a slightly more
general model, it would be possible to achieve the same incentives by resetting them at the money.
8For notational simplicity we have replaced the call options maximum operator by the realized observation (either zero or
a positive amount) below.
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α2 ≥ α0 (19)
where equation (15) represents the incentive compatibility constraint at t = 0 and (16) and (17) are
respective incentive compatibility constraints after no shock and shock.




pim(c1)− x0 . (20)
Moreover there is zero surplus given to the workers in the shock state,
α2(pim(c2)− x2)−µ2 = 0. (21)
Proof. As mentioned above, the options will always be reset in the shock state and there is no need to
provide surplus to the workers in that state. Therefore (17) will be satisfied with equality. This gives
(21). Substituting this into the initial period incentive compatibility constraint (15), this constraint
becomes
p(α1(pim(c1)− x0)−µ1)≥ ν .
Therefore
α1(pim(c1)− x0)−µ1 ≥ ν/p,
In which case the second period incentive compatibility constraint (16) after no shock is not binding.
Therefore there is no need to readjust the number of options granted upward in this case to provide
the requisite incentives, α1 = α0. Clearly there is no need to provide extra surplus to the workers in the
first period and therefore the first period incentive compatibility constraint then will bind:
p(α1(pim(c1)− x0)−µ1) = ν . (22)
Solving this equation for α0 = α1 then yields equation (20).
In contrast to the stock compensation case we see that it will never be necessary to reincentivize the
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workers after the no shock scenario. The original number of options granted and the original exercise
price will still provide proper motivation. However in the downward state when the shock is observed
the options price will have to be reset and possibly the number granted increased. Nevertheless the
workers will not earn any extra surplus in that situation.
We now consider a comparison of the surplus given to the workers in the stock compensation case
with the options compensation case.
COROLLARY 4. In the options compensation case, the rent given to the workers after no shock is observed is
equal to
α0(pim(c1)− x0)−µ1 = ν/p.
When stock is utilized and condition (9) is satisfied the rent given to the workers after no shock is observed
is equal to
s0(pim(c1)−pim(c2))−µ1 = (ν/p)−µ2.







In the options compensation case, the rent given to the workers after the shock is observed is always
zero. The rent given to the workers in the stock compensation case after the shock is observed is zero
when condition (10) is satisfied. When condition (9) is satisfied the rent given to the workers with stock
compensation is equal to
s0pim(c2)−µ2 = (ν/p)pim(c2) +µ1pim(c2)−µ2pim(c1)pim(c1)−pim(c2) .
Proof. Obtained by substituting the optimal solutions from corollaries 1, 2 and proposition 2.
Corollary 4 shows importantly that workers earn less surplus in the options compensation case
than they earn in the stock compensation case when the shock occurs when condition (9) is satisfied.
Otherwise they earn zero surplus in both cases. On the other hand workers earn positive rents after the
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no shock outcome. Nevertheless if the rent is positive in the stock compensation case, it is always less
than in the options compensation case. Therefore we conclude that workers earn higher rents in upside
states from options compensation than from stock, but lower rents in downside states as compared to
stock compensation.
The implications of corollary 4 are important to establishing the shareholder value from the use of
options compensation in the single firm case. This is recorded in the following result.
COROLLARY 5. The value to shareholders when options are used is given by
V (option) = ppim(c1) + (1− p)pim(c2)− ν − pµ1− (1− p)µ2. (23)
This result holds because unlike stock compensation, zero surplus is given in the state that results
from not committing initial effort. We can now see by comparing (23) with corollary 3 that options
dominate stock compensation in the single firm case whenever condition (9) holds. Otherwise the
shareholder values in the two compensation scenarios are identical.
PROPOSITION 3. The use of options-based compensation strictly dominates the use of stock based compen-
sation whenever condition (9) is satisfied. Otherwise, options-based compensation and stock compensation
are equivalent.
Proof. Subtracting equation (23) from equation (13) gives
V (option)− V (stock) = s∗0pim(c2)−µ2.
Thus the difference in shareholder values is exactly equal to the surplus earned by workers in the shock
state. Corollary 4 shows that workers earn surplus in the shock state only when condition (9) holds.
Otherwise it is zero.
This result confirms the usual intuition of optimal contracting theory in the context of our single firm
model. Since options have an additional contract parameter compared to stock, they can often provide
the same incentives at cheaper cost. In this case, the contracting imperfection caused by not being able
to reduce long term incentives in the interim downward state case be overcome with options but not
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with stock. Absent additional considerations, there would be no need to consider stock compensation.
We now explore whether this is still true when product market interaction occurs.
4 Competition Among Firms
In this section, we extend our model to an industry with two competing firms (indexed by i and j).
The key additional ingredient in the competitive situation is that the professional staff of both firms
are assumed to be mobile, that is once there is information at the interim date, they will work for the
highest bidder. While it is certainly true that some firms are able to get their chief executives to sign
‘non-compete’ clauses at the initial signing date, it is far less clear that such contractual restrictions are
enforceable at lower levels, either for management or professional staff such as engineers.9 Therefore
we assume that workers are not bound to the initial firm that they sign up with.
We consider first the case where the adverse shock is firm-specific, i.e., the shocks are independent
of each other. We further specify the following reduced form model of product and labor competition.
The two firms start with identical technological possibilities, costs, efforts and outcomes. At the interim
date, t = 1 whether one firm, both or neither has received the shock is publicly known. As a result of
this information, the firms can bid for each others employees in order to obtain an advantage in the
product markets. We assume that if both firms continue using their existing workers, they compete as
as a Cournot-Nash duopoly at time t = 2. Let pid(ci , c j) be the Cournot-Nash duopoly profit of firm i
given that firm i and firm j have production processes described by the technological costs, ci and c j ,
respectively. Alternatively, if one of the two firms, e.g., i, is successful in attracting the employees of
firm j, then we model the product market in terms of a Stackelberg duopoly game in which the firm
that attracts the workers from its rival becomes ‘leader’ and the firm that loses its workers becomes the
‘follower’. We denote the respective profits of the leader and follower as pisl(ci , c j) and pis f (c j , ci). The
Stackelberg follower firm must go into the labor market to hire new workers and compensate them
sufficiently so that they expend the effort at time t = 1.
There are several important assumptions that we make concerning the ordering of the profits in the
9A situation indicative of such competitive pressures came to light in 2005 when a key Microsoft employee, Kai-Fu Lee
was lured away by Google. Microsoft attempted to invoke a non-compete clause in its contract with Lee, but Google alleged
Lee spent the majority of his time in California where such clauses are not enforceable. .
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various duopoly situations. All of these assumptions are satisfied in the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg
models. First, we assume that it is better to be the low cost competitor in a duopoly compared to an
identical cost duopoly, i.e., pid(c1, c2) > pid(c1, c1) > pid(c2, c2). Moreover, we assume that it is better
to be a Stackelberg leader than a duopoly with identical cost parameters, which in turn is better than
being a Stackelberg follower, pisl(ci , c j) > pid(ci , c j) > pis f (ci , c j). Finally we assume that the sum of
Stackelberg profits in the two cost scenarios is sufficiently large compared to the sum of duopoly profits,
namely
pisl(c1, c2) +pis f (c2, c1)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1)> µ2.
This latter condition can be interpreted as meaning that the total industry profit in the Stackelberg
game is greater than the total industry profit in the Cournot-Nash game.
4.1 The Bargaining Subgame
With independent shocks, the probability that both firms do not observe the shock is p2 and the prob-
ability that both firms observe the shock is (1− p)2. In these two scenarios the firms are in symmetric
positions as far as anticipated costs are concerned. We assume that the two firms do not bid for each
others workers in these scenarios and that the workers continue to be employed by their original em-
ployer. Based on the single firm analysis the original incentives are sufficient when both firms do not
observe the shock, however they may have to provide additional incentives when both observe the
shock.
With probability 2p(1− p) the firms are in an asymmetric situation where one firm observes the
shock and the other does not. Now we consider the possibility where the firm without the shock might
make a bid for the staff of the firm with the adverse shock. Because workers are a scarce resource, we
model the bargaining game as one where the raiding firm must make an offer to the workers higher
than its rival is willing to pay to retain them. This implies that the workers might gain some additional
surplus due to competitive forces in the labor market.
Suppose that firm j has no shock while firm i observes a shock. First, suppose that firm i has granted
its employees stock compensation at the level, si . Therefore from the standpoint of the shareholders of
firm i, if the firm retains its employees the residual shareholder value will be (1− si)pid(c2, c1), since
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it would then find itself as the high cost competitor in a duopoly. If firm i were to lose its workers,
it would have to go back into the labor market and hire new ones at a cost µ2 and would earn profit
equal to pis f (c2, c1). Thus firm i willingness-to-pay in order to retain its workers would be the difference
between these two possibilities or
Wi = (1− si)pid(c2, c1)− p¯i,
where
p¯i= pis f (c2, c1)−µ2,
the outside option of the firm if it loses its workers. The firms existing workers could potentially demand
that their total compensation be raised therefore to
sipid(c2, c1) +Wi = pid(c2, c1)− p¯i.
This is the maximum amount that the workers can extract as compensation from the raiding firm.
Second, suppose that firm i has granted its employees options in the amount αi with exercise
price x i . Repeating the analysis above states that by retaining the employees, the shareholder value is
pid(c2, c1)−αi(pid(c2, c1)− x i). If the firm loses its workers it must as before recruit new ones and the
firm becomes a Stackelberg follower. The willingness-to-pay to retain the workers now becomes
Wi = pid(c2, c1)−αi(pid(c2, c1)− x i)− p¯i.
Once again, we see that the maximum amount the workers could potentially demand is
αi(pid(c2, c1)− x i) +Wi = pid(c2, c1)− p¯i.
This is identical with the case when stock is used for compensating the workers of the firm with the
adverse shock. Therefore the method of compensation does not matter as a form of defensive tactics
against a raid from the rival firm.
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Next we consider the impact of compensation choice on the offensive strategy of the raiding firm,
j. Suppose that firm j has used stock compensation at the level s j . If it is able to attract the workers of
firm i, its profit will increase by pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2). Hence given the fact that this increment must be
shared with the firms existing workers firm js maximum willingness to pay to attract its rivals workers
is
Wj = (1− s j)(pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)).
Therefore if Wj > pid(c2, c1) +Wi , firm j will be willing to pay more than firm i can afford to retain its
workers. This implies that in any equilibrium in which stock level s j = s0 is chosen initially this critical
condition becomes
s0 <
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2) . (24)
Similarly when firm j has chosen stock option compensation the maximum willingness to pay to
attract the workers of its rival is
Wj = (1−α j)(pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)).
Now when Wj < sipid(c2, c1)+Wi , firm j cannot afford to attract the workers. Therefore the critical con-
dition for option compensation α j = α0 to provide insufficient incentives to attract the rival employees
becomes
α0 >
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2) . (25)
Our results on the subgame bargaining game can now be summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. In any subgame in which firm i receives the shock while firm j does not, firm i loses
its workers to firm j and its workers receive total compensation equal to pid(c2, c1)− p¯i from their new
employer whenever firm j uses stock compensation s0 for its own workers and s0 < f where
f =
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2) . (26)
In the same subgame firm i is able to retain its workers by increasing their compensation to the level
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(1−α0)(pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2) only if firm j uses option compensation at the level α0 and α0 > f .
The critical condition, f , can be interpreted as the total gain by the entire industry from converting
the structure from a duopoly to a Stackelberg leader/follower situation, divided by the private gain
of the stronger firm in that industry. Equation (24) states that when the fraction of the single firm
gain extracted by existing workers of firm i is sufficiently less than the gain of the entire industry, the
industry will be transformed. On the other hand if options are used and (25) holds then dilution of the
gains are too great and the industrial structure remains at the status quo.
Notice the difference between conditions (24) and (25). We are assuming that the number of
shares, s0, required for provision of incentives is less than the critical amount on the right hand side of
(24), while the number of shares obtained by exercising options, α0, is above this same amount. This is
motivated by the fact that setting the initial option exercise price at the money requires a substantially
larger share allocation for incentive purposes. Indeed s0 is significantly less than α0 whenever options
exercise prices are at the money. This also conforms to the data mentioned in the introduction on the
higher proportion of ownership concentration in employees with stock option plans. In other words, we
are assuming that the potential dilution due to option compensation is significantly larger than that of
stock compensation. If either (24) or (25) are not satisfied, then there are no strategic considerations
in the use of stock v. options compensation and we are essentially back to the single firm analysis.
We now consider the three respective choices of compensation in a game theoretic situation (stock-
stock, option-stock and option-option). Firms choose their compensation simultaneously at the initial
time.
4.2 Stock Compensation
We now derive the value to shareholders when both firms choose stock compensation. To reduce the
amount of notation without losing any of the economic insights, we henceforth assume that no further
effort is required of workers in either firm when they do not observe a shock, i.e., we set µ1 = 0 in
the sequel. Obviously, since no further effort is required, it is never necessary to reincentivize workers
without the shock, the only possibility for a binding incentive compatibility constraint is when the
firm realizes the adverse shock. But here when the workers are raided by the rival firm without the
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shock, there is again no need for reincentivization. The only situation occurs when both firms realize
the shock. Therefore, when the following condition, analogous to (9) is satisfied, we know that the





This assumption is maintained throughout the analysis of the competitive situation.
Define the following matrix, Ass, representing the profit of firm i in the various subgames when both
i and j use stock. In this matrix, the rows represent the two outcomes, no shock and shock for the rival
firm, j, and the columns represent the states of no shock and shock for the firm i.
Ass =
 (1− s0)pid(c1, c1) p¯i
(1− s0)pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i (1− s0)pid(c2, c2)
 . (28)
Similarly the outcomes from the standpoint of workers in firm i in the respective states can be written
as Bss where
Bss =
s0pid(c1, c1) pid(c2, c1)− p¯i
s0pisl(c1, c2) s0pid(c2, c2)−µ2
 . (29)








pid(c2, c1)− p¯i s0pid(c2, c2)−µ2

. (31)
The elements of this vector represent the respective outcomes when the workers of firm i are bid away
by the rival, firm j, and remain with firm i respectively.
We can then define the problem of choosing an optimal level of stock compensation when the rival






p¯>Bss p¯− ν ≥ r¯>ss p¯. (33)
In problem (32), we have used the facts that the interim incentive compatibility constraints are non-
binding. Since the initial incentive compatibility constraint is binding, we can solve for the shareholder
value as the total organizational surplus minus the expected costs of effort:
V (stock|stock) = p¯>(Ass + Bss)p¯− ν − r¯>ss p¯.
Expanding this expression we find that the shareholders of firm i realize the following net payoff in a
(stock,stock) equilibrium:
V (stock|stock) = p2pid(c1, c1) + p(1− p)pid(c2, c1) + (1− p)p[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i] + (1− p)2pid(c2, c2)




p2[pid(c2, c1)− p¯i] + ν − p(1− p)µ2
p2pid(c1, c1) + (1− p)ppisl(c1, c2)− p(1− p)pid(c2, c2) . (35)
There are two differences in the competitive environment that differ from the firm payoff in the single
firm case. Both pertain to the implications of winding up in the down state when the competitor has
favorable news. Firstly the firm loses its workers and so it only receives the outside option in this
situation. Secondly the workers are bid away by the competitive firm and paid the potential duopoly
profit net of the outside option they could have received by their original employer. This potential profit
leads to increased rent that the firm has to bear ex ante. Therefore both effects wind up hurting the
firm.
Equation (35) reflects the share that must be allocated to the initial staff to provide maximum




Suppose now that firm i switches to stock option compensation with initial level α0 and exercise price
x0, but firm j remains using pure stock compensation. As previously firm i will again lose its workers
when it observes the shock but firm j does not. When firm i selects options, its shareholder value in
the various states becomes:
Aos =
pid(c1, c1)−α0[pid(c1, c1)− x0] p¯i
pid(c1, c2)−α0[pid(c1, c2)− x0] pid(c2, c2)−α2[pid(c2, c2)− x2]
 . (36)
As in the previous case, because firm j uses stock, firm i loses its staff when it has the adverse shock
and firm j does not. However, unlike the previous case, firm i is unable to attract the workers of firm j
when it does not have the shock. Worker compensation is
Bos =
α0[pid(c1, c1)− x0] pid(c2, c1)− p¯i
α0[pid(c1, c2)− x0] α2[pid(c2, c2)− x2]−µ2
 . (37)
Worker reservation wages are also given by:
r>os =

pid(c2, c1)− p¯i α2[pid(c2, c2)− x2]−µ2

. (38)





p¯>Bos p¯− ν ≥ r>os p¯ (40)
α2[pid(c2, c2)− x2]−µ2 ≥ 0. (41)
In problem (39), the initial incentive compatibility condition (40) is binding as in the previous case.
But now the interim incentive compatibility condition (41) in the adverse state will also be binding
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since originally issued options are underwater.
Since both (40) and (41) are binding, we can substitute both with equality and we obtain the
following expression for the shareholders of firm i’s payoff:
V (option|stock) = p2pid(c1, c1) + p(1− p)pid(c2, c1) + (1− p)ppid(c1, c2)
+ (1− p)2pid(c2, c2)− ν − (1− p)2µ2− p[pid(c2, c1)− p¯i].
(42)
It is instructive to contrast the firm’s payoff here in equation (42) with that of (34). In the symmetric
stock case, firm i is able to attract the rival workers and become a Stackelberg leader when it does not
realize the shock but its rival does. But the expected compensation, (1−p)p[pid(c2, c1)−p¯i], paid to the
rival workers must be subtracted out of the organizational surplus in this case, and it coincides exactly
with the surplus obtained in the opposite state where firm i loses its workers to firm j. In the asymmetric
case firm i never becomes a Stackelberg leader and the organizational surplus always consists of the
duopoly profits. Notice that in both relations – in contrast with the single firm case – the workers do
get non-zero rents. The term p[pid(c2, c1)− p¯i] which occurs in both equations represents the increase
in compensation when the workers shirk but the rival firm gets good news and they threaten to leave
unless they receive all the profit net of the outside option. This is due to the necessity of increasing
their compensation to prevent them from being bid away by the rival firm when the rival’s interim news
is good.
We can now take the results of (34) along with (42) together to solve for a sufficient condition for
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where both firms in a duopoly utilize stock compensation.
PROPOSITION 5. Both firms in competition will choose a pure strategy equilibrium involving the use of stock
if V (stock|stock)> V (option|stock) or, equivalently, if
θ ≡ p[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i]> s∗0pid(c2, c2)−µ2, (43)
where s∗0 is defined by equation (35).
Therefore we have found the possibility that pure stock compensation can survive if the rival firm
uses stock compensation. In similarity with the single firm case stock compensation yields rents to the
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workers that cannot be adjusted. However, there is a benefit from pure stock compensation that is not
present in the single firm case. This is due to the possibility that the required shares allocated to the
workers is lower than what is required under option compensation. Hence the firm has a higher residual
value with which to compete for the workers of a rival firm when that firm has interim negative news
(the adverse shock). If this possibility of market leadership is significantly better than either duopoly
possibility then the firm will stay with stock compensation when its rival employs the same.
4.4 Option Compensation
In the final case, we suppose that both firms choose stock option compensation. In this case, firm i is not
at risk from losing its employees although it does have to increase their compensation above the zero
rent situation given by merely resetting the exercise price. Firm i solves the following principal-agent





p¯>Boo p¯− ν ≥ r¯>oo p¯ (45)
α2[pid(c2, c1)− x2]−µ2 ≥ 0, (46)
where
Aoo =
pid(c1, c1)−α0[pid(c1, c1)− x0] pid(c2, c1)− (1−α∗0)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)]




α0[pid(c1, c1)− x0] (1−α∗0)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)]−µ2









Since both (45) and (46) are satisfied with equality, these can be substituted into (44) to yield the
following payoff to shareholders of firm i:
V (option|option) = p2pid(c1, c1) + p(1− p)pid(c2, c1) + (1− p)ppid(c1, c2) + (1− p)2pid(c2, c2)
− ν − (1− p)µ2− p{(1−α∗0)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)]−µ2}.
(50)
The firm payoff in this case has a similar interpretation to that of equation (42). The firm never
goes out of business by losing its workers to the rival. However there is a rent that must be paid to the
workers to prevent them from being bid away.
The final case to consider is where firm i switches to pure stock compensation but firm j remains





p¯>Bso p¯− ν ≥ r¯>sop (52)
where the respective payoff matrices are defined as
Aso =
 (1− s0)pid(c1, c1) pid(c2, c1)− (1−α∗0)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)]
(1− s0)pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i (1− s0)pid(c2, c2)
 , (53)
Bso =
s0pid(c1, c1) (1−α∗0)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)]−µ2








The payoff to the shareholders of i is then:
V (stock|option) =p2pid(c1, c1) + p(1− p)pid(c2, c1) + (1− p)p[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i] + (1− p)2pid(c2, c2)




p2{(1−α∗0)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)]−µ2}+ ν − p(1− p)µ2
p2pid(c1, c1) + (1− p)ppisl(c1, c2)− p(1− p)pid(c2, c2) . (57)
Equation (57) corresponds with (35). Now the firm in question has the possibility of becoming
a Stackelberg leader; however it suffers rent to its own workers in the down state. Equation (57)
represents the share necessary to provide ex ante incentives to the workers when the rival chooses
option compensation.
As before, comparing equations (50) and (56) yields the necessary conditions for a pure strategy
equilibrium in which both rival firms compete by offering options to their professional staffs.
PROPOSITION 6. The use of option compensation by both firms in a duopoly setting is a Nash equilibrium if
V (option|option)> V (stock|option) or, equivalently, if
s∗∗0 pid(c2, c2)−µ2 > p[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i] = θ , (58)
where s∗∗ is given by equation (57), and the equilibrium quantity of options by is given by α∗0 defined by
α∗0 =
p2pisl(c1, c2)− p2pid(c1, c2) + ν − p2µ2
p2pisl(c1, c2) + p2pid(c1, c1) + p(1− 2p)pid(c1, c2)− px0 . (59)
Proof. The equilibrium condition for α∗0 is obtained by setting both incentive compatibility conditions,
(45) and (46), as equalities and solving for α0 with α0 = α∗0.
Generally speaking which of the two symmetric pure strategy equilibria occurs depends on the
magnitude of the term θ = p[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1)+pis f (c2, c1)−µ2]. This is greater the
greater is the likelihood that initial effort does not result in an adverse shock. It is also larger in product
market situations where the industrial payoff to Stackelberg leadership is substantially larger than
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the sum of both duopoly situations. We know that where there are technological ‘races’ the payoff to
establishing either explicit market dominance (via patents) or implicitly by locking up the most valuable
and innovative professional staffs is very large. This by itself would tend to indicate a greater likelihood
of realizing the stock-based compensation equilibrium. However along with such technology-driven
races also often arises a greater need for frequent revisions of plans and adjustments. This indicates
that p may be lower. This has a countervailing effect. Now one would tend to see situations where
firms optimally respond by incentivizing workers with options.
There is also the possibility of an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which one firm uses stock
compensation and its rival uses stock option compensation. This occurs when both the conditions in
propositions 5 and 6 are violated. Proposition 7 characterizes this form of equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 7. The use of option compensation by one firm and stock by its rival in a duopoly setting is
a Nash equilibrium if neither (43) nor (58) holds. In this case the firm that uses stock grants s∗∗0 shares
satisfying (57), with the equilibrium quantity of options given by α0 = α∗∗0 defined by
α∗∗0 =
p2[pid(c2, c1)− p¯i] + ν
p2pid(c1, c1) + p(1− p)pid(c1, c2)− px0 . (60)
Proof. The equilibrium condition for α∗∗0 is obtained by setting both incentive compatibility conditions,
(40) and (41), as equalities and solving for α0.
4.5 Uniqueness
Propositions 5 and 6 provide the conditions under which either type of symmetric Nash equilibrium
can occur. As is clear from examining conditions (43) and (58) the key determinant will be how s∗∗,
the optimal stock incentives when a rival uses options is related to s∗, the optimal stock compensation
response when a rival uses stock. We show below in proposition 8 that s∗∗ < s∗, which then implies that
the Nash equilibrium form is always unique. The reason that s∗∗ < s∗ is due to the payoff received by
the workers in the downward state where their initial employer receives the shock. When the rival uses
options, it has to give its own existing workers such a large share of the potential enhanced profits that
it cannot afford to recruit additional staff. Hence the employees do not benefit as much from shirking
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as when the rival firm uses stock. On the other hand, when the rival firm uses stock compensation, it
can afford to and will therefore pay the duopoly profit to attract them and this makes ex ante shirking
more profitable. As a result their initial employer has to pay a higher level of stock compensation to
motivate the initial effort. We prove this formally in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 8. The equilibrium in the industrial competition game is unique and is determined by the
following respective conditions.
(a) If condition (43) holds, (stock,stock) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(b) If condition (58) holds, (option,option) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(c) If neither (43) nor (58) holds, the equilibrium is asymmetric and one firm chooses option compen-
sation while the other firm chooses stock compensation.
Proof. Let α∗0 be the equilibrium number of call options granted if one firm chooses option compen-
sation in the equilibrium. From the requirement that workers are not bid away when the firm uses
options, (25), we have
α∗0 >
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1) + p¯i
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2) .
It follows from the above inequality that
1−α∗0 <
pid(c2, c1)− p¯i
pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c1, c2) .
Substituting this inequality into equation (57) yields
s∗∗ < p
2[pid(c2, c1)− p¯i−µ2] + ν − p(1− p)µ2
p2pid(c1, c1) + (1− p)ppisl(c1, c2)− p(1− p)pid(c2, c2) < s
∗,
where the second inequality follows from equation (35) and µ2 > 0. Hence, if condition (43) holds,
condition (58) cannot hold. However, if condition (43) does not hold, condition (58) may or may not
hold.
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5 Implications and Extensions
In this section we explore the implications of our model and then consider extending the analysis to
situations where shocks are imperfectly correlated across firms, early vesting, other forms of contingent
compensation contracting and accounting issues surrounding compensation.
5.1 Market Structure
The analysis of the previous section shows that the implications of our model for compensation are first
and foremost driven by the nature of industry competition in a duopoly. In this respect, the total gains
from moving from Cournot-Nash to Stackelberg in any asymmetric cost situation are given by
θ/p = pisl(c1, c2) +pis f (c2, c1)−pid(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1)−µ2.
The question relates to the magnitude of this quantity. When the respective cost differences are not large
between two rivals and product demands are fairly elastic there is not much to be gained in conversion
to Stackelberg structure and therefore the potential industry gains are slim. Since this term shows up
in the numerator of the critical condition (26), this means that f is near zero and the conditions for
aggressive behavior in the labor market is not satisfied, independent of whether stock or options are
used. Hence the analysis essentially reverts to the case where firms choose their compensation policies
independent of one another and options dominate stock. This mimics what happens when there is only
a single monopolistic firm in an industry.
When θ/p is still near zero but (24) and (25) are both satisfied (due to the significance of private
gains to the leading firm in a Stackelberg industry) then proposition 6 applies and it is still the case that
both firms choose options in equilibrium. Therefore we conclude that when potential industry gains are
limited, firms act the same way in competition that they would do as monopolists, already dominating
an industry.
As θ/p increases due to increased benefits assuming that the necessary conditions for disparate
offensive strategies are satisfied, (24) and (25), we reach a point where the conditions of proposition
7 are satisfied and firms select different strategies. One firm selects stock options and its rival selects
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pure stock compensation.
As θ/p increases further and the sufficient condition for private gains to becoming a Stackelberg
leader remain satisfied, then firms would wind up as in proposition 5 and both would select stock to
compensate their workers. In this situation we would also expect the most aggressive bidding when
one firm sees weakness in its rival.
Since industry conditions do not remain constant over time, our model predicts a form of ‘life-
cycle’ compensation practices in an industry. With a single monopolistic firm, options would be used;
later after entry and increased competition one would expect to see heterogeneous policies; when an
industry shakeout has occurred and there are two very aggressive competitors, both would shift to the
use of stock. In the limiting case where one firm could drive its rival completely out of business by
recruiting its workers, then the surviving firm becomes a monopolist and then switches back to the use
of options compensation.
5.2 Correlated Shocks
We now focus on the implications of p, the probability of not observing a shock and extend the model
to the case of correlated shocks between the firm and its rival. In this more general case, the structure
of the sufficient conditions for existence of the pure strategy equilibria is preserved, although with a
change in the interpretation of the probability, p. Recall the key state in the model occurs when the
firm is in a strong position having received no adverse news, while the rival firm has the shock. The
threshold value, θ , that governs the nature of the equilibrium contained in (43) as well as (58) can be
written as
θ = Prob(i no shock| j shock)[pisl(c1, c2)−pid(c2, c1)−pid(c1, c2) +pis f (c2, c1)−µ2].
For the independent case the conditional probability, Prob(i no shock| j shock) is equal to p.
Now, as the possible shocks to both firms become positively correlated, this means that this con-
ditional probability is reduced and therefore θ decreases. From the results of propositions 5 and 6
this makes it more likely that the option-based equilibrium will obtain. Intuitively, it is less likely that
news is asymmetric between the firms and so it is not necessary to adopt a tougher stance in order to
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profit from the demise of a rival firm. From this, we can conclude that if the economic environment
is one where all firms are subject to similar shocks, we would expect a greater prevalence of options
compensation.
On the other hand, if shocks are negatively correlated, then the conditional probability embodied
in θ increases, eventually to unity under perfect negative correlation. Now θ also increases and it
becomes more beneficial to profit from the difficulties of a rival firm. As a result stock compensation
would tend to predominate. Therefore we can conclude that the macroeconomic climate and the
degree of competitiveness play a significant role in determining the nature of stock-based compensation
programs.
5.3 Vesting
We have heretofore assumed that workers at the firms are not vested with either options or stock until
the second period cash flow observation is observed. If they stay with the firm they are guaranteed
compensation conditional on the outcome of the relevant compensation equilibrium. However we as-
sumed that when they voluntarily take a competing offer from the rival they give up their compensation
rights completely.
Now consider what would happen if the firm were to vest their workers immediately so that they
would retain stock and options originally promised even if they should jump to the rival. First consider
the use of stock compensation. Then firm i obtains net profit (1− si)pid(c2, c1) if the workers remain,
as before. On the other hand, if they jump to the rival, the firm obtains (1− si)pis f (c2, c1)− µ2, which
is strictly less than without early vesting. Therefore the willingness to pay by firm i is
Wi = (1− si)(pid(c2, c1)−pis f (c2, c1))−µ2.
For the workers to be bid away from the rival firm, it is only necessary that its willingness to pay, Wj be
Wj > sipis f (c2, c1) +Wi ,
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or
Wj > (1− si)(pid(c2, c1)−pis f (c2, c1)) + sipis f (c2, c1)−µ2.
Since Wj for the rival firm is the same as before, it follows that this condition is much easier to satisfy
than before, whether a firm uses stock or options. Intuitively vesting stock allows the rival to attract
the workers more cheaply because the original firm is still paying most of the original compensation.
When the original employer uses options, its willingness to pay is unaffected whether the options
vest or not. The reason is that when the firm realizes the adverse shock, the options are underwater and
therefore if the workers leave there is no reason to reset the exercise price and they remain underwater.
Therefore if the firm were to utilize vesting for its compensation policies, this creates a divergence
between defensive practices for retaining workers. In fact it makes it unlikely that the firm will be able
to retain its stock-compensated workers after the shock. This implies that not vesting stock immediately
is an important ingredient of an optimal compensation policy.
5.4 State-contingent Stock Compensation
The major benefit of options compensation in this model derives from the ability to utilize state-
contingent compensation features to simultaneously increase productive efficiency and reduce excess
rent. On the other hand, in the competitive market the use of such compensation creates the possibility
of dilution. This raises the issue of whether instead to use stock compensation that is only granted (or
vested) at a later date based on intermediate outcomes. An example of this is given by the changes to
the compensation package of GEs CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, when he ascended to his position in 2003.10
In fact it is true that state-contingent stock compensation would dominate both options as well as un-
conditional stock grants in the model of product market competition. This is because the maximum
amount of stock granted will never be larger than the unconditional stock grant, so there is lower po-
tential dilution; and at the same time the stock can be granted at only the minimum level to provide
incentives in the second period. Thus, all potential rent is extracted.
However, the use of state-contingent stock compensation is very sensitive to an assumption that the
10Specifically the GE board awarded Immelt 250,000 performance units. One-half would vest at the end of five years only
if cash flow from operations grew at least by 10 percent each year; the other half would vest only if the GE stock price
performance exceeded that of the S&P 500 index.
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intermediate state (shock or no shock) is a contractible event. In order to induce ex ante effort, the
workers have to believe that the stock grant will be larger when the shock does not occur. But once the
shock has not occurred the firm has no incentive to provide the larger grant because no additional effort
is required. Hence the firm would have an incentive to renege on the promise, or to misrepresent the
state. Note that such a time inconsistency problem does not occur with options compensation because
the firm voluntarily reprices the options when the shock occurs because this is in the firm’s interest. In
summary, while contingent stock compensation can potentially resolve these agency problems, it is less
robust than the other methods of dealing with asymmetric information situations.
5.5 Accounting Issues
One of the basic features of this model is that the firm does not face any direct cash flow implications
at the initial date when compensation is determined, nor does it face any cash flow consequences of
option repricing. This is consistent with the strict interpretation of the FASB regulation both before
2005 and afterward, when firms were required to expense at-the-money options. Such expensing is
only used for reporting and not for tax accounting. Therefore any costs associated with either grants or
option repricings must be indirect and not easily quantified. It is noteworthy that some firms voluntarily
expensed their options even before the rules change. What seems clear is that with the new regulations
any new incremental ‘cost’ of repricing is less than before the change in regulations when with the
original exercise price they were not expensed. Therefore our model is even more applicable under
the current scenario. As a result our finding that stock can survive as an optimal compensation form
remains as relevant as ever.
6 Conclusions
This paper has highlighted some important differences between straight stock compensation and option
compensation in an agency model with multiple periods and information revelation over time. As
compared with extant views, we do not find universal domination of options over stock. Stock has
certain commitment properties that options do not have. We have related the respective uses to the
nature of industrial competition both from the product market as well as the labor market perspective.
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It is often mentioned that the major benefit of options is that they have the same incentive properties
as stock, at lower cost, i.e., the firm can ‘afford’ to give up a greater share of potential dilution because it
is receiving the exercise price as compensation. This potential benefit, however, has a serious limitation
when product market competition is considered. The provision of options to existing employees means
that they will also share in the appreciation of value if rival firms workers are bid away. This lessens the
‘toughness’ with which a given firm can compete in the product markets. As a result ex ante shareholder
value may be lower than when stock is utilized. When such conditions do not exist, however, the
flexibility of options is still better than the commitment afforded by the use of stock. The basic driving
force for this result occurs when options are set at the money. It is clear that this result is preserved as
long as options are set near the money.
This paper points out the importance that product market competition has when the supply of pro-
ductive staff is limited. This is especially true for high technology industries. We have argued that when
the need for frequent revisions is great and that when these revisions tend to occur contemporaneously
across firms in the same industry, then firms respond by using options. However as this frequency
becomes less because the industry is more stable, or if good news to one firm makes it more likely that
bad news has occurred for its rival, then firms might optimally respond by changing their method of
compensation to stock. This conclusion is reinforced in situations where there are large gains to leader-
ship in an industry. Therefore we find an important difference between a situation where an industry is
already dominated by a firm (in which case options are utilized) and when the potential for domination
is great (in which case stock should be utilized). These considerations can potentially explain some
of the changes that have occurred in high technology industries as they have matured and developed
increased customer demands over the last decade. .
It is clear from these investigations that the extent to which firms can profit in competition with
their rivals is determined by and therefore impacts their choice of incentive-based compensation. The
optimal responses in this more interesting setting are not as obvious as when a firm views itself in
isolation from others. As firms begin to recognize their potential opportunities as well as vulnerabilities,




A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let s∗0 be the solution to (3), the initial amount of stock granted to the workers. Define the following:
s¯1 =
µ1




where s¯1 and s¯2 are the amounts of stock granted in the second period if the incentive compatibility






and thus s¯1 < s¯2.
There are three mutually exclusive cases: (i) s∗0 ≤ s¯1 < s¯2, (ii) s¯1 < s∗0 ≤ s¯2, and (iii) s¯1 < s¯2 < s∗0,
one of which would characterize the solution to the principal-agent problem (3). Consider case (i) first.
Since s∗0 ≤ s¯1 < s¯2, the second-period incentive compatibility constraints (5) and (6) are both binding.
Substituting s1 = s¯1 and s2 = s¯2 into the first-period incentive compatibility constraint (4) yields
pµ1pim(c2)
pim(c1)−pim(c2) ≥ ν ,
which violates assumption (1). Hence, s∗0 > s¯1, implying that the second-period incentive compatibility
constraint in the no-shock state is never binding.
Now consider case (ii). Since s¯1 < s
∗
0 ≤ s¯2, the first-period incentive compatibility constraint (4)
and the second-period incentive compatibility constraint (6) are both binding. Substituting s1 = s∗0 and












This is condition (10) in the proposition. Hence, if the above condition holds, the solution to the
principal-agent problem is given by s0 = s1 = s∗0 and s2 = s¯2.
Finally, consider case (iii). Since s¯1 < s¯2 < s
∗
0, the first-period incentive compatibility constraint (4)
is binding but the second-period incentive compatibility constraints (5) and (6) are not. Substituting











This is condition (9) in the appendix. Hence, if the above condition holds, the solution to the principal-
agent problem is given by s0 = s1 = s2 = s∗0.
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